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ITALIAN BATTLESHIPS
OF WORLD WAR II
MARK STILLE
ILLUSTRATED BY PAUL WRIGHT
NEW VANGUARD • 182
ITALIAN BATTLESHIPS
OF WORLD WAR II
MARK STILLE
ILLUSTRATED BY PAUL WRIGHT
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
4
ITALIAN NAVAL STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE BATTLESHIP
4
ITALIAN BATTLESHIP DOCTRINE
6
NAVAL TREATIES AND ITALIAN BATTLESHIP CONSTRUCTION
6
ITALIAN BATTLESHIP WEAPONS
8
ITALIAN BATTLESHIP RADAR
11
THE BATTLESHIP CLASSES
12
• Cavour Class
• Duilio Class
• Vittorio Veneto Class
ITALIAN BATTLESHIPS AT WAR
31
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
43
BIBLIOGRAPHY
46
INDEX
48
ITALIAN BATTLESHIPS
OF WORLD WAR II
INTRODUCTION
One of the most misunderstood aspects of the naval war in the Mediterranean
is the role of the Italian Navy’s capital ships. The commonly held perception
is that they were committed only sparingly and, when faced with the British
fleet, were always defeated. The actual story is far different and deserves
proper attention. After entering the war, the Italians committed their
battleships aggressively. Even after the disaster at Taranto, where several ships
were placed out of action (but only one for the duration of the war), the
Italians continued to employ their battleships as part of their strategy to retain
control of the central Mediterranean. It was only late in the war, principally
driven by fuel shortages, that the Italians ceased operations of their remaining
capital ships. Ironically, the most dramatic loss of an Italian capital ship came
at the hands of their former German allies when the Italians changed sides
in September 1943. By the end of the war, three of the four rebuilt Italian
battleships remained in service, together with two of the three modern
battleships. This book tells the story of the seven Italian battleships that saw
service between 1940 and 1943.
ITALIAN NAVAL STRATEGY AND THE ROLE OF THE
BATTLESHIP
Between the wars, the
Regia Marina
(Royal Navy) considered the French
Navy as its most likely opponent. Increasingly in the 1930s, as Italian foreign
policy became expansionist, war with Great Britain was seen as inevitable.
When Italy entered the conflict in June 1940 by declaring war on France and
Great Britain, the
Regia Marina
was not ready for war. This did not matter
to Italian dictator Benito Mussolini, who judged that he had entered into the
final stages of a brief conflict and that Italy was on the winning side. Given
this perception, the Italians were loath to risk their fleet. The generally
cautious Italian naval planners were also driven by the fact that losses to the
fleet, especially battleships, could not be readily replaced by Italy’s weak
maritime industry. Thus, in essence, the Italians had no incentive to risk their
fleet in a short war.
Going into the war, the
Regia Marina
had several primary missions.
Foremost was maintaining communications with Libya in North Africa and
the Balkans. This required the movement of regular convoys to those areas.
Another important task was the control of the central Mediterranean, thus
4
denying its use to the British. This
was a key strategic factor during the
war, as it dramatically increased the
shipping requirements to maintain
British forces in the Middle East.
Unable to use sea lanes through the
Mediterranean, the British were
forced to use the Cape of Good Hope
route around Africa, a total distance
of 12,000 miles. This quadrupled
shipping requirements compared
with the Mediterranean route and
had strategic implications for Allied
capabilities and plans worldwide.
Instrumental to being able to move
convoys to Africa and keeping
the Mediterranean closed to Allied
shipping was the maintenance of
Italy’s battle fleet.
However, even within this strategically defensive construct, the
Regia
Marina
did anticipate employing its battle fleet against the British. Even in
a short war, this was to be done as soon as possible, but only close to Italian
bases in the central Mediterranean. The Italians did not foresee operations by
their heavy units in the eastern or western Mediterranean. As the war became
extended, the
Regia Marina
never abandoned these general intentions,
except for a single foray into the eastern Mediterranean with disastrous
results. While strategically the
Regia Marina
was essentially defensive, the
Italians employed their battleships aggressively on the operational level to
achieve their primary missions until the point where fuel shortages precluded
operations by large ships. However, the fairly aggressive commitment of
battleships on the operational level did not translate to comparable aggression
on the tactical level, but overall it cannot be said that the
Regia Marina
cowered in harbor during the war.
Cavour
leading
Cesare
in a
line ahead in 1938. When the
Italians entered the war in
1940, these were the only
two operational battleships
available to engage the British
Mediterranean Fleet. (Naval
History and Heritage
Command)
By August 1940, both
Littorio
(foreground) and
Vittorio
Veneto
were operational. Both
are shown here conducting
gunnery exercises. Together,
these ships formed the most
powerful battle squadron in
the Mediterranean. (Naval
History and Heritage
Command)
5
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