Us Army 3 - Top Secret Defense - Biological Weapons Technology 2.pdf - US army - piotrzachu69

SECTION III

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

SECTION 3—BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY

Scope

Highlights

3.1

Biological Material Production .............................................. II-3-9

3.2

Stabilization, Dissemination, and Dispersion ......................... II-3-15

• Biological weapons are unique because they are made up of

pathogenic organisms that can reproduce and cause infection (and

death) in a large number of hosts.

• It takes hours to days for symptoms of exposure to appear.

• Biological weapons are relatively inexpensive to produce.

• All of the equipment used to produce biological agents is dual

use, with applications in the pharmaceutical, food, cosmetic,

and pesticide industries.

• Dissemination and dispersion are key to the effective employment

of biological weapons.

• Many toxic organisms are subject to destruction by external forces

(e.g., sunlight, explosives).

3.3

Detection, Warning, and Identification ................................... II-3-19

3.4

Biological Defense Systems ................................................... II-3-23

BACKGROUND

Biological agents are naturally occurring microorganisms (bacteria, viruses, fungi)

or toxins that can cause disease and death in a target population. They can also attack

the food supply and/or materiel of a nation. Biological weapons (BW) which project,

disperse, or disseminate biological agents have two characteristics that enhance their

effectiveness as weapons: (1) biological agents, other than toxins, reproduce and,

therefore, a small amount of infectious agent can cause disease; (2) biological agents,

other than toxins, usually require an incubation period of hours to days to manifest

signs of exposure so the affected soldier is not certain whether a biological agent at-

tack has occurred until illness sets in. The uncertainty can compromise unit cohesion

and weaken U.S. force superiority.

The United States has forsworn the use of biological weapons and has developed

a strategy of offensive strike power by other means, coupled with biological defense

capability, as a suitable deterrent to potential adversaries. A nation, subnational group,

or organization, or even an individual, determined to construct a biological weapon

and release the agent can, with minimal financial resources and infrastructure, produce

an effective weapon. Small amounts of biological material are sufficient because of

the reproductive nature of microorganisms. The availability of small amounts of bio-

logical organisms, including those listed by the Australia Group (AG), in culture col-

lections provides a major resource for such determined entities. All of these stocks are

also available from natural sources, such as soil samples and infected rodents. In

addition to naturally occurring organisms, genetically modified organisms may be used

as biological agents. Some organisms exist primarily in repositories and may be used

as biological agents (Variola Virus). It is estimated that between 10 and 10,000 viru-

lent organisms of the AG agents are sufficient to cause illness in one individual. The

number of organisms required is a function of the specific agent and the means of

delivery. The delivery of a limited amount of a biological agent might be militarily

significant if the agent is released in a contained environment (e.g., a closed building,

submarine, or surface vessel).

There are aspects that make biological weapons agents unique and different from

all other weapon systems. Whereas a subnational group would be required to have a

significant infrastructure to develop nuclear devices, it would be less complicated to

make biological agents. Moreover, the biological agent could be a strategic and disor-

ganizing threat because of its ability to reproduce and the delayed manifestation of

symptoms. Those delivering BW could be protected by active or passive immuniza-

tion or by well-designed protective masks to protect the respiratory system from aero-

sols, the primary delivery mechanism.

An additional concern is the relative low cost required for the production and the

ease of deployment of biological agents by subnational groups and organizations for

biomedical, pharmaceutical, and food production. All of the equipment used to pro-

duce biological agents is dual use.

Because biological agents reproduce, only small amounts of a starter organism

are needed. The use of appropriate growth media or nutrients in a cell culture system

of 100 liters, or of four passes through a 25-liter system, can generate sufficient agent

to infect numerous targets in a contained area (e.g., subway, contained office build-

ing). Other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) require the purchase of large amounts

of precursor or of fissile material to achieve threat capability. The self-generation of

the biological agent is a unique element of this WMD.

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Biologically derived toxins also present a threat. The recent apprehension in the

United States of an individual citizen who produced large quantities of the toxin ricin

is an example of the danger related to the production of toxin WMDs by small groups.

As with other chemical agents, the toxins do not reproduce and, therefore, represent a

threat that differs quantitatively from biological agents.

1. History of Biological Weapons

Crude forms of biological warfare have been employed since 300 B.C., when the

decaying corpses of animals and humans were placed near water and food supplies of

adversaries. Over the years, different diseases, including plague and smallpox, were

used as the agent. Catapults were one vehicle for introduction of the infected tissue.

Other vehicles, including blankets, have been employed to transmit smallpox to a tar-

get population.

World War I saw the development of biological warfare strategies. Cholera and

plague were thought to be used in Italy and Russia while anthrax was presumably used

to infect animals in Romania. A consequence of such events was the 1925 Protocol for

the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare—known as the Geneva Protocol. This protocol

banned the use of biological agents in warfare but not research, development, produc-

tion, or stockpiling of such agents.

With the advent of World War II, rapid developments occurred in biological war-

fare capability in the United States and other nations. In February 1942, the U.S.

National Academy of Sciences established a Biological Warfare Committee, chaired

by Edwin B. Fred of the University of Wisconsin. The administration of the biological

warfare effort was placed under civilian supervision: Dr. George Merck directed the

advisory group, and Ira Baldwin of the University of Wisconsin became the scientific

director. In 1943, Fort Detrick, Maryland, became the site of these activities, as

Camp Detrick. In Canada, Sir Fredrick Banting, Dr. J.R. Collys, and Dr. Charles Best

led the biological warfare capability effort.

The technologies examined at Fort Detrick included pathogen identification, modes

of transmission, infection, detection, public health measures, containment, rapid dry-

ing of organisms, and packing for delivery. In 1969, President Nixon stated that the

U.S. unilaterally renounced biological warfare. Biological weapon stockpiles and their

associated munitions were destroyed following the preparation of an environmental

impact statement and review by both federal and state authorities and the public. Low

targeting capability, the potential for catastrophic outcome on civilian populations,

and public antipathy to biological weaponry were factors in the renunciation of bio-

logical warfare. In 1972, there was international agreement to the Convention of the

Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and

Toxin Weapons and their Destruction [Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)]. Con-

cern over USSR compliance with the Convention arose with the sudden outbreak of

anthrax cases in Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinenberg) in 1979.

The early 1980’s saw renewed discussion of the utility of biological weapons as

strategic weapons. For example, information became publicly available concerning

studies of biological agents in Japan and the studies on the effects of infectious agents

on human subjects in Harbin, Manchuria, during World War II. The number of infec-

tious agents used on human populations was about 25 (e.g., plague, typhus, smallpox,

tularemia, gas gangrene, tetanus, cholera, anthrax, tick encephalitis). In 1941, the

Japanese deployed plague-infected fleas in Hunan Province, resulting in the death of

several hundred persons. The difficulty encountered by the Japanese was the develop-

ment of an effective delivery system.

In recent years, newly emerging infectious diseases have complicated the picture.

They include AIDS, prion disorders, and several hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola.

These diseases and the possible reduction in immunocompetence have fostered an

increased role of the United States and international agencies in monitoring disease

outbreaks. Several federal agencies in the United States are responsible for the health

and protection of the population, including military personnel, from infectious dis-

eases. The civilian agencies include the National Institutes entities that address health

care issues of primary importance to the defense community: Walter Reed Army Insti-

tute of Research, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Dis-

eases (USAMRIID), and the Naval Medical Research Units.

2. Recent Developments Affecting Biological Warfare Capability

The introduction of modern biotechnology during the past 25 years has markedly

changed the qualitative and quantitative impact that biological warfare, or the threat of

such warfare, can have on military forces and urban communities. This new technol-

ogy provides the potential capability of (1) developing biological agents that have

increased virulence and stability after deployment; (2) targeting the delivery of organ-

isms to populations; (3) protecting personnel against biological agents; (4) producing,

by genetic modification, pathogenic organisms from non-pathogenic strains to com-

plicate detection of a biological agent; (5) modifying the immune response system of

the target population to increase or decrease susceptibility to pathogens; and (6) pro-

ducing sensors based on the detection of unique signature molecules on the surface of

biological agents or on the interaction of the genetic materials in such organisms with

gene probes. The specific technologies used in realizing these capabilities include

(1) cell culture or fermentation; (2) organism selection; (3) encapsulation and coating

with straight or crosslinked biopolymers; (4) genetic engineering; (5) active or passive

immunization or treatment with biological response modifiers; (6) monoclonal anti-

body production; (7) genome data bases, polymerase chain reaction equipment, DNA

sequencers, and the rapid production of gene probes; and (8) the capability of linking

gene probes and monoclonal antibodies on addressable sites in a reproducible manner.

New technologies related to biological warfare are emerging rapidly. The tech-

nology of monoclonal antibody production has existed only since 1975, while the

technology of genetic engineering has existed since the 1980’s. Technology for

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sequencing the genomes of organisms has changed so dramatically that the rate of

sequencing has increased by several orders of magnitude since 1994. All of these

reflect the enormous change in information databases and in technology including

biotechnology, computer equipment, processes, and networking of research teams. In-

formation that will emerge from the human genome effort is likely to increase our

understanding of the susceptibilities of different populations to disease and stresses of

various sources. Such information may increase the proliferation of BW agents, par-

ticularly in areas with active ethnic rivalries, and lead to a new variant of ethnic cleans-

ing.

- Gene Probes - These are polynucleotides that are 20–30 units bend, under strin-

gent conditions, complementory nucleic acid fragments characteristic of biological

agents. These units provide the basis of rapid detection and identification.

OVERVIEW

This section of the MCTL is concerned with technologies related to the develop-

ment, integration and deployment of biological weapons . The infectious organisms

discussed are those identified by the AG (see Figure 3.0-2). The AG list does not

include every known organism that could be used in a biological weapon. Toxins will

be considered in the biological weapons section consistent with the AG and the BWC

of 1972. Several aspects of biological warfare will be covered: (1) the identity of the

biological organism or toxins; (2) equipment and materials necessary for the produc-

tion, containment, purification, quality control, and stabilization of these agents;

(3) the technologies for the dissemination and dispersion of biological agents; (4) equip-

ment for detection, warning, and identification of biological agents; and (5) individual

and collective biological defense systems.

RATIONALE

Biological weapons are unique because the effects from pathogenic organisms,

except toxins, are not seen for hours to days after dissemination. If adequate detection

devices are not available, the first indication of a biological weapon attack could be

symptoms in target personnel. At this point, treatment propylaxis and therapy is often

ineffective. In addition, incapacitated troops require tremendous logistical support

(four or five medical corpsmen and associated personnel for each ill person); thus,

incapacitants may be preferable to lethal agents. Also, besides deaths caused by infec-

tious agents, the psychophysical damage suffered by troops who believe they have

been exposed to a biological attack could markedly impair combat functions. The

perception is almost as significant as the reality. The affected soldier is not certain

whether a biological attack has occurred and could be psychologically, if not physi-

cally, impaired.

The biological technology industry is information intensive rather than capital

intensive. Data on technologies involved in biological production are widely avail-

able in the published literature. These technologies are dual use, with applications in

the pharmaceutical, food, cosmetic, and pesticide industries. New technologies, such

as genetic engineering, are more likely to affect fabrication, weaponization, or

difficulty of detection than to produce a “supergerm” of significantly increased patho-

genicity.

The rapid rate of development reflects to some degree the national and interna-

tional investment in this technology. The level of federal spending in the United States

in the entire biotechnology area during 1994 approximated 4 billion dollars. The pri-

vate sector invested approximately 7 billion dollars during the same year. This invest-

ment and the rate of information accrual indicates that biological technology that can

be used for peaceful and military purposes is increasing in capability at a rate exceed-

ing most other technologies. The pharmaceutical industry is relying on biotechnology

for new therapeutic products to improve prophylaxis and therapy for many different

diseases and is concerned that these new technologies not fall into the hands of poten-

tial adversaries.

Figure 3.0-1 portrays graphically the explosive growth of applicable biotechnolo-

gies. The illustration was prepared from a broad field of knowledge and applications,

which, in aggregate, are doubling every 18 months. Examples of sustained geometric

growth include monoclonal antibodies, combinatorial chemistry, and gene probes, which

are explained below.

- Monoclonal Antibodies - In the early 1970’s, Kohler and Milstein developed a

procedure to produce antibodies for a single antigenic epitope. An epitope is the re-

gion of a molecule that initiates the production of a single antibody species. The

dimensions of an epitope approximate a surface area 50

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50 Angstroms. These anti-

bodies are called monoclonal antibodies. With quality control, these antibodies can

be produced in gram quantities in a highly reproducible manner, and therefore, they

are suited for industrial uses. The industries currently using monoclonal antibodies

include medical diagnostics, food, environmental protection, and cosmetics.

- Combinatorial Chemistry - This is a technique for rapidly synthesizing large

numbers of peptides, polynucleotides, or other low molecular weight materials. These

materials are synthesized on a solid-state matrix and in an addressable form so that

materials of known sequence can be accessed readily. The materials can function as

receptors, pharmaceuticals, or sensor elements. The technique, developed by Merrifield

in the 1970’s, has been essential for the growth of combinatorial chemistry.

(Height of line indicates rate of development—time to double)

(Arrows show enabling technologies)

5 yr

1 yr

6 Months

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Uses

Solid State Peptide and

Nucleic Acid Synthesis

1970

• Pathogen Masking

• Detection

Vaccines

Nucleic Acid Probes

• Sensors

• Personal Protection

• Vaccines

• Pathogen Masking

Chimeric Monoclonal Antibodies

Monoclonal Antibodies

1972

Sensors

1984

• Multiarray Biopathogen

Detector

• Sensors, Human Genome,

Pathogen, Soldier Selection,

Active Protection

• Robust Toxicant or

Pathogen

• Disease suscepitibiliity

• Stress Susceptibility

• Toxicant Resistance

DNA Engineering

1982

Pathogen Efficacy

1992

Human Genome Project

1989

Encapsulation and Stabilization

• Personal Protection

• Therapeutics

Antibiotics

• Treatment

Bioactive Peptides

• Enhance Human Perform-

ance and Protection

Cell Growth Chambers/Fermenters

• Pathogen Masking

• Detection

1940

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

Figure 3.0-1. Progress in Applicable Biotechnologies

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