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Hegemony or survival :
America's quest for global dominance
Noam Chomsky
Contents
1. Priorities and Prospects
2. Imperial Grand Strategy
3. The New Era of Enlightenment
4. Dangerous Times
5. The Iraq Connection
6. Dilemmas of Dominance
7. Cauldron of Animosities
8. Terrorism and Justice: Some Useful Truisms
9. A Passing Nightmare?
Notes Index
All notes in this text refer to original notes located here
Metropolitan Books
Henry Holt and Company, LLC
Publishers since 1866
115 West 18th Street
New York, New York 10011
Copyright © 2003 by Aviva Chomsky, Diane Chomsky, and Harry Chomsky
All rights reserved. Distributed in Canada by H. B. Fenn and Company Ltd.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication data
Chomsky, Noam.
Hegemony or survival : America's quest for global dominance / Noam Chomsky. 1st ed.
Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 0-8050-7400-7
1. United States—Foreign relations—2001- 2. United States—Foreign relations— 20th century. 3.
Imperialism. 4. United States—Military policy. 5. Unilateral acts (International law) 6. Intervention
(International law) 7. State-sponsored terrorism. 8. War on Terrorism, 2001- I. Title.
E902.C47 2003 327.73'009'0511—dc22
2003058195
expanded endnotes and an e-book with additional background, discussion, and
sources.
First Edition 2003
Designed by Paula Russell Szafranski
Printed in the United States of America
13579 10 8642
Chapter 1
Priorities and Prospects
A few years ago, one of the great figures of contemporary biology, Ernst Mayr, published
some reflections on the likelihood of success in the search for extraterrestrial
intelligence. 1 He considered the prospects very low. His reasoning had to do with the
adaptive value of what we call "higher intelligence," meaning the particular human form
of intellectual organization. Mayr estimated the number of species since the origin of life
at about fifty billion, only one of which "achieved the kind of intelligence needed to
establish a civilization." It did so very recently, perhaps 100,000 years ago. It is generally
assumed that only one small breeding group survived, of which we are all descendants.
Mayr speculated that the human form of intellectual organization may not be favored by
selection. The history of life on Earth, he wrote, refutes the claim that "it is better to be
smart than to be stupid," at least judging by biological success: beetles and bacteria, for
example, are vastly more successful than humans in terms of survival. He also made the
rather somber observation that "the average life expectancy of a species is about 100,000
years."
We are entering a period of human history that may provide an answer to the question of
whether it is better to be smart than stupid. The most hopeful prospect is that the question
will not be answered: if it receives a definite answer, that answer can only be that humans
were a kind of "biological error," using their allotted 100,000 years to destroy themselves
and, in the process, much else. The species has surely developed the capacity to do just
that, and a hypothetical extraterrestrial observer might well conclude that humans have
demonstrated that capacity throughout their history, dramatically in the past few hundred
years, with an assault on the environment that sustains life, on the diversity of more
complex organisms, and with cold and calculated savagery, on each other as well.
TWO SUPERPOWERS
The year 2003 opened with many indications that concerns about human survival are all
too realistic. To mention just a few examples, in the early fall of 2002 it was learned that
a possibly terminal nuclear war was barely avoided forty years earlier. Immediately after
this startling discovery, the Bush administration blocked UN efforts to ban the
militarization of space, a serious threat to survival. The administration also terminated
international negotiations to prevent biological warfare and moved to ensure the
inevitability of an attack on Iraq, despite popular opposition that was without historical
precedent.
Aid organizations with extensive experience in Iraq and studies by respected medical
organizations warned that the planned invasion might precipitate a humanitarian
catastrophe. The warnings were ignored by Washington and evoked little media interest.
A high-level US task force concluded that attacks with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) within the United States are "likely," and would become more so in the event of
war with Iraq. Numerous specialists and intelligence agencies issued similar warnings,
adding that Washington's belligerence, not only with regard to Iraq, was increasing the
long-term threat of international terrorism and proliferation of WMD. These warnings too
were dismissed.
In September 2002 the Bush administration announced its National Security Strategy,
which declared the right to resort to force to eliminate any perceived challenge to US
global hegemony, which is to be permanent. The new grand strategy aroused deep
concern worldwide, even within the foreign policy elite at home. Also in September, a
propaganda campaign was launched to depict Saddam Hussein as an imminent threat to
the United States and to insinuate that he was responsible for the 9-11 atrocities and was
planning others. The campaign, timed to the onset of the midterm congressional elections,
was highly successful in shifting attitudes. It soon drove American public opinion off the
global spectrum and helped the administration achieve electoral aims and establish Iraq
as a proper test case for the newly announced doctrine of resort to force at will.
President Bush and his associates also persisted in undermining international efforts to
reduce threats to the environment that are recognized to be severe, with pretexts that
barely concealed their devotion to narrow sectors of private power. The administration's
Climate Change Science Program (CCSP), wrote Science magazine editor Donald
Kennedy, is a travesty that "included no recommendations for emission limitation or
other forms of mitigation," contenting itself with "voluntary reduction targets, which,
even if met, would allow US emission rates to continue to grow at around 14% per
decade." The CCSP did not even consider the likelihood, suggested by "a growing body
of evidence," that the short-term warming changes it ignores "will trigger an abrupt
nonlinear process," producing dramatic temperature changes that could carry extreme
risks for the United States, Europe, and other temperate zones. The Bush administration's
"contemptuous pass on multilateral engagement with the global warming problem,"
Kennedy continued, is the "stance that began the long continuing process of eroding its
friendships in Europe," leading to "smoldering resentment." 2
By October 2002 it was becoming hard to ignore the fact that the world was "more
concerned about the unbridled use of American power than . . . about the threat posed by
Saddam Hussein," and "as intent on limiting the giant's power as ... in taking away the
despot's weapons." 3 World concerns mounted in the months that followed, as the giant
made clear its intent to attack Iraq even if the UN inspections it reluctantly tolerated
failed to unearth weapons that would provide a pretext. By December, support for
Washington's war plans scarcely reached 10 percent almost anywhere outside the US,
according to international polls. Two months later, after enormous worldwide protests,
the press reported that "there may still be two superpowers on the planet: the United
States and world public opinion" ("the United States" here meaning state power, not the
public or even elite opinion). 4
By early 2003, studies revealed that fear of the United States had reached remarkable
heights throughout the world, along with distrust of the political leadership. Dismissal of
elementary human rights and needs was matched by a display of contempt for democracy
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