India Burma.pdf

Introduction

World War II was the largest and most violent armed conflict in

the history of mankind. However, the half century that now sepa-

rates us from that conflict has exacted its toll on our collective knowl-

edge. While World War II continues to absorb the interest of military

scholars and historians, as well as its veterans, a generation of Ameri-

cans has grown to maturity largely unaware of the political, social,

and military implications of a war that, more than any other, united

us as a people with a common purpose.

Highly relevant today, World War II has much to teach us, not

only about the profession of arms, but also about military prepared-

ness, global strategy, and combined operations in the coalition war

against fascism. During the next several years, the U.S. Army will

participate in the nation’s 50th anniversary commemoration of World

War II. The commemoration will include the publication of various

materials to help educate Americans about that war. The works pro-

duced will provide great opportunities to learn about and renew pride

in an Army that fought so magnificently in what has been called “the

mighty endeavor.”

World War II was waged on land, on sea, and in the air over sev-

eral diverse theaters of operation for approximately six years. The

following essay is one of a series of campaign studies highlighting

those struggles that, with their accompanying suggestions for fur-

ther reading, are designed to introduce you to one of the Army’s sig-

nificant military feats from that war.

This brochure was prepared in the U.S. Army Center of Military

History by David W. Hogan. I hope this absorbing account of that

period will enhance your appreciation of American achievements

during World War II.

M. P. W. Stone

Secretary of the Army

India-Burma

2 April 1942–28 January 1945

“We got a hell of a beating,” Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell told the

crowd of reporters in the Indian capital of New Delhi. It was May

1942, and the American general, who had only recently arrived in the

Far East to assume the position of chief of staff to Chinese leader Chi-

ang Kai-shek, was chafing at failure in his first command in the field.

Following the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor the previous Decem-

ber, the Japanese had won victory after victory, extending their em-

pire from Wake Island in the Pacific to Malaya and Singapore in

Southeast Asia. When Stilwell had arrived in the embattled Chinese

capital of Chungking in March, the Japanese were already driving into

Burma, capturing the capital of Rangoon on 6 March. The American

general took command of two Chinese divisions and, in cooperation

with the British and Indians, tried to stem the Japanese onslaught.

Defeated, he and his staff endured a rugged, 140-mile hike over jun-

gle-covered mountains to India. By occupying Burma, the Japanese

had not only gained access to vast resources of teak and rubber, but

they had dosed the Burma Road, 700 miles of dirt highway that rep-

resented China’s last overland link with the outside world. The re-

opening of an overland route to China would be the major American

goal, indeed obsession, in the theater throughout the campaign.

Strategic Setting

The objective of restoring a land route to China originated in

part in hard strategic considerations, specifically the need to keep

China in the war to tie down Japanese troops and serve as a base for

future operations against the Japanese home islands. But it also re-

flected an idealistic American view of China as a great power, ca-

pable of a major contribution, and the romantic image held by many

Americans of China’s heroic struggle against superior Japanese

equipment and arms. For nearly three years the United States would

thus push for a major effort to break the Japanese blockade, for-

ward large quantities of lend-lease materials, and train the fledgling

Chinese Army and Air Force.

The Americans soon found the situation to be much more com-

plex than they had anticipated. Far from heroic, China’s govern-

ment and army were riddled with inefficiency and graft. Although

personally honest, Chiang Kai-shek preferred to leave the defeat of

Japan to the other Allies and husband his resources for a postwar

showdown with his mortal enemies, the Communists. The British,

for their part, cherished few illusions about China’s war-making po-

tential. They were more concerned about the defense of India and

restoration of control over their former colonies, including Burma,

and they complained that the Americans could see no purpose for

the theater “except to cover General Stilwell’s supply route.” Brit-

ish imperial designs, in turn, met with suspicion among Americans,

who had little enthusiasm for a war to restore the British Empire.

Aside from the trials of coalition politics, the Allies would face

one of the most inhospitable areas for military operations in the

world. For the Americans the theater not only covered a vast area,

but it was also at the end of a 12,000-mile supply line. The area

where the Allies would campaign was characterized by extremely

rugged terrain with few roads and other communications, condi-

tions which would favor the defense and reduce the Allies’ advan-

tage in numbers. Northern and central Burma, where they would

conduct the bulk of their operations, had steep, densely wooded

mountain ranges cut by streams. The Allies would need to scale

precipitous ranges along the border to reach one of Burma’s three

great river valleys—the Chindwin, the Irrawaddy, or the Salween—

in order to move south into the heart of Burma. They could also ex-

pect their advance to be slowed by the monsoon, near-constant rains

which could last from two to three months, anytime after April.

Leeches, flies, ticks, and other insects, along with such diseases as

malaria, dysentery, and typhus, added to a soldier’s miseries.

Operations

The recovery of Burma would be the constant preoccupation of

the American theater commander, one of the war’s most contro-

versial figures. “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell had served in China during

the interwar years, knew the country, and could speak its language

fluently, but sloppiness as an administrator and planner, along with

a sharp tongue, ill suited him for his largely diplomatic responsibil-

ities. He blamed British defeatism and Chinese incompetence for

the loss of Burma and made snide comments on other Allied lead-

ers, notably Chiang Kai-shek, to whom he referred in his diary as

“Peanut.” On the other hand, if Stilwell seemed overworked at

times, it was understandable, given the sheer number of positions he

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