Aristotle - The Categories.pdf - Aristotle - pestis

The Categories

Aristotle

The Categories

Table of Contents

The Categories. ....................................................................................................................................................1

Aristotle. ..................................................................................................................................................1

Section 1. ..............................................................................................................................................................1

Part 1. .......................................................................................................................................................1

Part 2. .......................................................................................................................................................2

Part 3. .......................................................................................................................................................2

Part 4. .......................................................................................................................................................2

Part 5. .......................................................................................................................................................3

Part 6. .......................................................................................................................................................6

Section 2. ..............................................................................................................................................................8

Part 7. .......................................................................................................................................................8

Part 8. .....................................................................................................................................................11

Section 3. ............................................................................................................................................................15

Part 9. .....................................................................................................................................................15

Part 10. ...................................................................................................................................................15

Part 11. ...................................................................................................................................................18

Part 12. ...................................................................................................................................................18

Part 13. ...................................................................................................................................................19

Part 14. ...................................................................................................................................................20

Part 15. ...................................................................................................................................................20

The Categories

Aristotle

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Section 1

· Part 1

Part 2

Part 3

Part 4

Part 5

· Part 6

Section 2

Part 7

Part 8

Section 3

· Part 9

Part 10

Part 11

Part 12

Part 13

· Part 14

Part 15

E−text supplied by Glyn Hughes glynhughes@btinternet.com

Translated by E. M. Edghill

Section 1

Part 1

Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition

corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture can both lay claim to

the name 'animal'; yet these are equivocally so named, for, though they have a common name, the definition

corresponding with the name differs for each. For should any one define in what sense each is an animal, his

definition in the one case will be appropriate to that case only.

On the other hand, things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition

answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both 'animal', and these are univocally so named,

inasmuch as not only the name, but also the definition, is the same in both cases: for if a man should state in

what sense each is an animal, the statement in the one case would be identical with that in the other.

Things are said to be named 'derivatively', which derive their name from some other name, but differ from it

in termination. Thus the grammarian derives his name from the word 'grammar', and the courageous man

The Categories

The Categories

from the word 'courage'.

Part 2

Forms of speech are either simple or composite. Examples of the latter are such expressions as 'the man runs',

'the man wins'; of the former 'man', 'ox', 'runs', 'wins'.

Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are never present in a subject. Thus 'man' is

predicable of the individual man, and is never present in a subject.

By being 'present in a subject' I do not mean present as parts are present in a whole, but being incapable of

existence apart from the said subject.

Some things, again, are present in a subject, but are never predicable of a subject. For instance, a certain point

of grammatical knowledge is present in the mind, but is not predicable of any subject; or again, a certain

whiteness may be present in the body (for colour requires a material basis), yet it is never predicable of

anything.

Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present

in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar.

There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject, such as the

individual man or the individual horse. But, to speak more generally, that which is individual and has the

character of a unit is never predicable of a subject. Yet in some cases there is nothing to prevent such being

present in a subject. Thus a certain point of grammatical knowledge is present in a subject.

Part 3

When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also

of the subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will,

therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'.

If genera are different and co−ordinate, their differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance

the genus 'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two−footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of

'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge

does not differ from another in being 'two−footed'.

But where one genus is subordinate to another, there is nothing to prevent their having the same differentiae:

for the greater class is predicated of the lesser, so that all the differentiae of the predicate will be differentiae

also of the subject.

Part 4

Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time,

position, state, action, or affection. To sketch my meaning roughly, examples of substance are 'man' or 'the

horse', of quantity, such terms as 'two cubits long' or 'three cubits long', of quality, such attributes as 'white',

'grammatical'. 'Double', 'half', 'greater', fall under the category of relation; 'in a the market place', 'in the

Lyceum', under that of place; 'yesterday', 'last year', under that of time. 'Lying', 'sitting', are terms indicating

position, 'shod', 'armed', state; 'to lance', 'to cauterize', action; 'to be lanced', 'to be cauterized', affection.

Part 2

The Categories

No one of these terms, in and by itself, involves an affirmation; it is by the combination of such terms that

positive or negative statements arise. For every assertion must, as is admitted, be either true or false, whereas

expressions which are not in any way composite such as 'man', 'white', 'runs', 'wins', cannot be either true or

false.

Part 5

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of

a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those

things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which,

as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species 'man', and the genus

to which the species belongs is 'animal'; these, therefore−that is to say, the species 'man' and the genus

'animal,−are termed secondary substances.

It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable

of the subject. For instance, 'man' is predicted of the individual man. Now in this case the name of the species

man' is applied to the individual, for we use the term 'man' in describing the individual; and the definition of

'man' will also be predicated of the individual man, for the individual man is both man and animal. Thus, both

the name and the definition of the species are predicable of the individual.

With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that

neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the

definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance,

'white' being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the

definition, however, of the colour white' is never predicable of the body.

Everything except primary substances is either predicable of a primary substance or present in a primary

substance. This becomes evident by reference to particular instances which occur. 'Animal' is predicated of

the species 'man', therefore of the individual man, for if there were no individual man of whom it could be

predicated, it could not be predicated of the species 'man' at all. Again, colour is present in body, therefore in

individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body

at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in

them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist.

Of secondary substances, the species is more truly substance than the genus, being more nearly related to

primary substance. For if any one should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a

more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus.

Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by

stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while

the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a

more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'.

Moreover, primary substances are most properly called substances in virtue of the fact that they are the

entities which underlie every. else, and that everything else is either predicated of them or present in them.

Now the same relation which subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between

the species and the genus: for the species is to the genus as subject is to predicate, since the genus is

predicated of the species, whereas the species cannot be predicated of the genus. Thus we have a second

ground for asserting that the species is more truly substance than the genus.

Of species themselves, except in the case of such as are genera, no one is more truly substance than another.

We should not give a more appropriate account of the individual man by stating the species to which he

Part 5

Aristotle - The Categories.pdf

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