Caldiero.pdf

No Turkeys 1 – 2008 Febbraio

Game 1

Caldiero 1796

Introduction

After the defeat at Castiglione (5th August), the Austrian FML

Wurmser began a quick retreat along the Tyrol’s mountain

roads. In order to defend its positions, Bonaparte fought, still,

with the strategy, which had enabled him to overcome the

Austrians at Castiglione. While blocking an Austrian column

with weak troops, he went under the other column and beat it

with the main French Army. Being sure of the first Austrian

column’s retreat to the mountains, Bonaparte threw his men on

the second column and beat it too. With this procedure

Bonaparte defeated again Wurmser and Quosdanovich in the

combats of Bassano and Roveredo (September). Hardly pursued

into the mountains, Wurmser found safety only while being

locked up in Mantua where he remained with his battered army.

Indeed, the Austrian army of Italy was again rebuilt with

powerful reinforcements brought from Germany by the Emperor

and recruited in the Frontier lands. Wurmser being wedged in

Mantua, it was necessary to find a new General to command the

Austrian army in Italy. The Hofkriegsrat choice was General

Alvinczy, leader of the new Friaul Armée, who was entrusted

with the high command. Alvinczy set up a new offensive plan.

This one had two objectives:

1. release the Austrian army of Wurmser, locked up in Mantua.

2. take again all the Italian territories the French Army of

Bonaparte had seized in Italy.

Once again, General Bonaparte found himself in the necessity to

fight an Austrian army twice higher in number of troops. To tell

the truth, he was practically in numerical inferiority for eight

months (from April to November 1796). If compared to the two

plans missed by Wurmser, the offensive plan of Alvinczy was

partially more detailed on tactics. This light improvements,

moreover of the numerical superiority of the Austrians, allowed

Alvinczy to inflict to Bonaparte his first historical reverse in the

battle of Caldiero (November 12, 1796).

Alvinczy’s “Friaul Armée”

stopped at Caldiero, Nov. 12th

Late in October 1796, Austrians were completing activities for

their third offensive. A new commander, FML Jozséf Alvinczy,

was given the mission of relieving his antecedent (Wurmser) in

Mantua. Austria tried to assemble some 60,000 soldiers, a

hypothetical superiority of about 20,000 over the Armée d’Italie,

which now included 160 Chasseurs of the “Légion Lombarde”.

At the beginning of November Alvinczy crossed the Piave with

two columns, the right under Quosdanovich and the left under

Marquis de Provera, while Davidovich threatened the Vaubois’

division in the Adige Valley, east of Lake Garda. Following his

verified principle of “central position”, Bonaparte decided to

stop Davidovich’s advance before concentrating against the

main Austrian force: the Army of Friaul. Bonaparte sent

Berthier to Vaubois with orders to attack, while Masséna slowly

withdrew before Alvinczy. On this occasion the plan produced

conflicting results; Vaubois, badly beaten on 6 November;

retreated onto the Rivoli’s Plateau while at the same time,

Masséna seized a chance to inflict a reverse on Alvinczy’s

advance guard. Bonaparte’s irritation at the first defeat in Tyrol

went out in an open censure of Vaubois’ division behaviour:

“Soldiers, I am not satisfied with you; you have shown neither

discipline, nor perseverance, nor bravery; no position could rally you;

you abandoned yourselves to panic; you let yourselves be driven from

positions where a handful of brave men might have stopped an army.

Soldiers of the 39th and 85th [demi-brigades], you are not French

soldiers. “Then, turning to the chef d’etat-major, he said: “Let their

colours be inscribed: ‘They no longer form part of the Army of

Italy’.”

(Correspondance de Napoleon I er , II 131 - No. 1170).

The two wings of the Army of Italy were forced back near

Verona, but still placed between the Austrians and Mantua.

Bonaparte was in a very difficult situation. If Davidovich had

kept up the energy of his advance, after defeating Vaubois, and

had achieved a link with the Alvinczy’s Army, the French

condition would have been desperate. In all probability this

could have ended the siege of Mantua with Bonaparte facing an

overwhelming force.

On 10 November Alvinczy, informed of Davidovich’s

successes, decided to attack Verona in hopes of linking up with

Davidovich at the same time. On 11 November he reached

Villanova (26 km east of Verona) and sent out a strong advance

guard to the hills running from Caldiero north through

Colognola ai Colli.

From the Caldiero area, the Vedettes of the Austrian advance

guard pushed forward to within two miles of Verona at San

Michele Extra, where stationed 1500 French soldiers. Two

Austrian battalions and two Hussars’ squadrons got in touch

with the S. Michele outposts and convinced the Advance Guard

Command it should be possible to attack Verona on 12th, in the

morning. Alvinczy, carefully, ordered an Intelligence mission to

be performed by large patrols of Cavalry, the quickest riders of

the Empire: the Hussars. He went personally up to Vago to

recognize the situation, while, at the same moment, the French

Arriére Garde withdrew until the eastern city’s access “Porta

Vescovo”.

General Bonaparte was informed about the sudden advance of

the Austrians and probably saw the opportunity to destroy

Alvinczy’s advance guard in its forward position and to build

much needed morale. The French moved out at three P.M. of 11

November, drove in the enemy outposts of San Michele, and

camped at San Martino Buonalbergo, some 8 km east of Verona.

At 16.00 hrs. Major General Prince Frederick Hohenzollern, the

Austrian Advance Guard Commander, retreated to Vago taking

a defensive position along the left bank of a water channel

(Canal de Vago) where a stone bridge let cross the main road to

Verona. Other two support battalion of General Sticker’s

brigade converged with artillery in this point at dusk. By the

same time the Avantgarde of French General Augereau engaged

the bridge. The defenders, leaded by Hohenzollern himself and

Major Siegenfeld, commander of the 7th Croat Grenzer

battalion (Carlstadt Banalisten) lasted until 22.00 hours when

the cold night stopped the attacks. The Austrian lost 47 dead (1

was an Officer), 108 wounded (2 Officers), 249 fugitives or

prisoners (4 Officers); a whole count of 404 soldiers.

That short clash was a bell that alarmed both the opponents

giving the signal to be ready to arms. At midnight Alvinczy had

notice of a French units’ march to monte Giacomo, between

No Turkeys 1 – 2008 Febbraio

Game 2

Vago and Lavagno, and, worrying for his right flank, ordered to

Hohenzollern to withdraw into the village of Caldiero where he

wanted to deploy the new batte-order.

The Austrian front line was then organized with its centre at

Strà, a village or probably only about ten houses scattered along

the main road which leaded from Verona to Vicenza. The left

wing was in a strong position on the two Caldiero’s Heights

(mount San Mattia and La Rocca [the Castle]). The right was on

the Heights of mount Zovo and mount Oliveto reaching the

village of Colognola. The attack against these positions seemed

to be very difficult. The French troops had to march in open

plains, under artillery fire, mounting the bayonets during an

uphill rush in skirmish-formation.

However the risky Bonaparte’s attack was launched early on 12

November with Augereau advancing south of the main road

against Caldiero. Masséna advanced to the north to attack

Colognola and the adjacent hills. The day before Major General

Hohenzollern had reported his impressions on the French units

referring that: “Seem they are all beginning to retreat off Verona

in the attempt to support their general Vaubois, troubled in

Tyrol”. So bad as forecast.

November 12, 1796

(22e Brumaire an V) Defeat at Caldiero

Austrian Friaul Armée, arrived in sight of Verona, woke up in a

solid line on the two hills of Caldiero, 18 km east of the city,

where deployed its strong Advance Guard while the main body

(the Hauptkolonne) was in Villanova. Hohenzollern had just

merged, during the night, his Advance Guard’s troops with the

brigade of Colonel Sticker von Haymingthal, Commander of the

Imperial regiment n. 57 “Graf Joseph Colloredo-Waldsee” also

known as “Alt-Colloredo” (Old Colloredo). The Order of battle

was powerful: about 8000 soldiers and 26 guns, (8 battalions, 9

Hussar Sqns and 2 light Infantry Coys of Jägers, the Mahoney

or Mahony. In effect the first Austrian line was more similar to a

Division than to an Advance Guard formation. The outer

defence at Strà was assigned to the Siegenfeld’s battalion (7th

Carlstädter) which had an horse artillery piece on both flanks

and two heavy 12 pdrs guns behind the infantry. At the two

sides of the main road and behind the Carlstädter were a

Combined Hungarian Battalion (rights) and the Croat Grenzer

battalion Mizich or 3rd Combined Croat Grenzer Banal battalion

(3rd Komp. Banalisten) from Sticker’s Bde (left). Three

squadrons of Erdödy Hussars, placed behind the hills, in the left

side of the main road had the mission to support Strà whenever

attacked. Other three Erdödy Sqns. Were on the left side of the

main road, behind and under the m. Zovo. Caldiero’s village

was defended by a battalion of the Callenberg Rgt. scattered

among the houses and up until the La Rocca strongpoint. A

Gyulai’s Rgt battalion occupied the area of the San Mattia and

La Rocca Heights. Two 6 pdrs. Guns were on La Rocca, and

other two same calibers on S.Mattia. The village of Colognola

was defended by the Babogredacz Croat battalion or 2nd

Combined Banal Grenzer while the area from that town until m.

Zovo was secured by the Sticker’s Bde.: two heavy 12 pdrs.

Guns and the 4th Croat Banal Grenzer battalion where on m.

Zovo; Colonel Sticker with his Colloredo battalion, two

Wurmser Hussars sqns. and one 2nd Hussar Sqn. were between

Colognola and the village of Lorgnan (Orgnano).

Suddenly at 8.00 O’clock a message reached Alvinczy at

Villanova: “Der Feind in mehrerer Kolonnen zum Angriff nahe”

(Enemy coming close to attack by several Columns). Also if

Jomini’s numbers (about the French strength) could seem

exaggerated (Augereau division with 8340 men and Massena

with 9540) the slow advance of the “Blue” columns had to be a

very impressive sight, viewing it from the hill above. Massena

had split his division in two columns: the right, directly engaged

in a frontal attack against Colognola, the Zovo and the Strà’s

Flank; the left, committed to perform a march to the right

Austrian side, outflanking it from Lavagno to Illasi. Augereau

began the day trying to back the Croats of the 7th, broadening

the front of the attack, later in the morning, on his right against

Caldiero and Gombion.

08.30 hrs. The first Massena’s Column was blocked by a strong

artillery fire against its flank. In the meanwhile General

Augereau Advance Guard had attacked Strà more times, always

repulsed by the 7th Grenzer’s rifle fire. The wind began to

enforce from North East, then arrived rain mixed to snow and

finally, around 9.00 hrs. a true snow storm with powerful cold

wind blasts. In some moments the rain seemed to win against

snow and for ten minutes streams of water descended from the

sky. Then ice and snow returned to master the clouds. In these

conditions all guns and howitzer were pinned in their positions.

Infantry had many problems to advance too. Second Massena’s

Column attacked the Colognola Ridge and mount Zovo

launching the elite Carabiniers against a wall of ice and wind.

Here, unluckily, general Launay was captured with 40 men of

that elite companies (besides someone referred Launay as

caught prisoner at Strà like if he should have been operating in

the Augereau’s Av.Gd).

During the morning General Alvinczy had ordered to move

forward the Villanova’s Reserve in order to reinforce

Hohenzollern. The first Austrian column to start was the

General Brabeck brigade (4 Btns.) putting in the main road its

4000 men with the order to reach Caldiero. The snowstorm

hardly slowed the forward march causing a lot of stops (many

for attempts to push forward the guns) and the Austrian

employed about 6 hrs and 30 minutes for a 7 km march. This

could have become a decisive detail for a French victory but

their troops were too numerically inferior to hope so. As was

impossible to put all Austrian column in road march in the same

large main way, the second formation, Major General Schubirz

brigade (5 btns., around 5000 men), started on the right side of

the road, directed to Soave and then to Colognola and San Zeno.

The third, last, column (Marquis de Provera and Lieut.Col.

Gavassini with 4 btns. And 1 sqn. hussars; around 3500 men)

started on the left main road’s side, marching in the storm over

Castelletto until Gombion and La Rotta. During the late

morning, actually, General Augereau had extended his front

rights until the Adige’s bank: a movement Hohenzollern tried to

stop before with three, after with all six Erdödy Hussars

squadrons.

At midday the situation slowly evolved in a Austrian right wing

crisis. Colonel (or Chef-de-Brigade) Dupuy launched his

“invincible” 32nd Demi Brigade against Colognola and the

Zovo. The French line half-brigade “en Tirailleurs ordre” (all

deployed as skirmishers) occupied the slope and the Zovo’s

hilltop while the last Augereau’s attempt to control Strà was a

new failure. The storm went by; the sky became cloudy, the air

foggy and the ice, mud. All troops were so exhausted that no

new attack could have begun without fresh reinforcements. The

time stopped in long, heavy pause until the 15.00 hrs. Now

Austrian reinforcements had to arrive.

General Brabeck’s brigade entered in Caldiero at 16.30, coming

from east, with the Commander in Chief Alvinczy.

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