Smolensk Crash Status Report.pdf

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Crash of the Polish Governmental Plane PLF 101 in Smolensk 1
April 10, 2010
Status Report Dated November 11, 2011 2
1 According to the “Head” Instruction that governs the transportation of the officials of the Polish Republic such as
the President, Prime Minister, Chairperson of the Lower House of the Parliament and the Senate, the designation
“PLF 101” mean that the President is on board.
2 This Status Report was prepared by a multidisciplinary team of experts that supports the families of the Smolensk
victims.
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Smolensk Status Report November 2011
Introduction
The Republic of Poland, acting as the State of the Operator and the State of Registry pursuant
to Article 6.3 of Annex 13 to the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (“Chicago
Convention”), on December 19, 2010 submitted its comments to the draft Final Report
prepared by the Russian Federation that acted as the State of Occurrence, the State of Design,
and State of Manufacturer and conducted the investigation into the crash of the Tu-154M
aircraft tail number 101 dated April 10, 2010 (“Smolensk Crash”). The Tu-154M aircraft, flight
101 from Warsaw, Poland to Smolensk, Russia, carried the President of Poland and 95 Polish
citizens traveling for the commemoration of the 70thieth anniversary of the Katyn Crime.
The Remarks of the Republic of Poland to the draft Final Report of the Russian Federation dated
December 19, 2010 (“Polish Response”) were submitted to the Russian Federation in Polish and
Russian languages but were not officially translated into English. 3 Therefore, the families of the
Smolensk victims hired the most renowned international firm Transperfect Translations to
perform the translation of the Polish Response to the draft Final Report of the Russian
Federation on the Smolensk Crash into English. 4 The Russian Federation, acting through the
Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) as the investigator-in-charge, disregarded the Polish
Response, in particular the Polish objection as to the causes of the crash, and announced its
Final Report with its own conclusions as to the causes of this crash at a press conference in
Moscow on January 13, 2011 (“IAC Final Report”).
In its investigation into the Smolensk Crash, the Russian Federation requested the assistance of
the United States with respect to recovering the TAFS and FSM readings by the US
manufacturer of these systems - Universal Avionics Systems Corporation from Redmond,
Washington. The United States acting through the National Transportation Safety Board
provided the requested assistance, however did not receive the status of the accredited
representative to participate in the investigation to the Smolensk Crash as allowed by article
5.23 of the Chicago Convention. At least one citizen of the United States lost his life in the
Smolensk Crash.
The objections to the investigation of the Russian Federation into the Smolensk Crash are
multifold and of fundamental nature. They range from challenging the credibility of the IAC by
virtue of its members acting in direct conflict with their official positions with the designer,
manufacture and servicer of Tu-154M aircraft to challenging the IAC investigation and the
conclusions of the IAC Final Report in its entirety, as presented by the Republic of Poland in the
Polish Response. The Polish objections to the Russian investigation process range from denying
No attempts by the Polish Government have been made to translate the Polish Response to the
Russian investigation into English. It is entirely up to non-governmental organizations and private
persons that the Western reader can learn of this official Polish Response and confront the scope of
irregularities of the Russian investigation into the Smolensk Crash.
4 Sponsors of the English translation of the Polish Response (“Polish Response in English”) are: The Katyn
2010 Family Association, Ul. Chełmżyńska 98C, 04-247 Warszawa, Poland, Mobile (Poland): +48 784 756
531 Mobile (UK): +44 793 555 7562; +44 796 936 2341 e-mail: polish.remarks@gmail.com .
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Smolensk Status Report November 2011
the Republic of Poland access to the investigation by preventing the Polish Accredited
Representative from participating in the IAC meetings, denying Polish requests for information
and assistance, to destroying, falsifying and manipulating the evidence, providing inadequate
rescue and medical assistance to the victims of the crash, conducting the investigation in
violation of ICAO standards, and drafting the IAC Final Report in violation of Annex 13 to the
Chicago Convention. This Status Report does not intend to address all issues arising in
connection with the Russian investigation into the Smolensk Crash but rather highlights the
most important problems and the most representative violations.
IAC Investigation Conducted in Violation of International Agreements
Three days after the Smolensk Crash, the Republic of Poland and the Russian Federation
entered into an agreement to proceed with the investigation of the Smolensk Crash in
accordance with the Chicago Convention. The parties agreed to proceed in accordance with
Annex 13 to the Chicago Convention that governs aircraft accident and incident investigation
(“Annex 13”). Accordingly, the Russian Federation as the State of Occurrence was in charge of
conducting the investigation while the Republic of Poland designated its Accredited
Representative to participate in the investigation in accordance with Article 5.18 of the Chicago
Convention.
In the course of the investigation, the Polish Government acting through its Accredited
Representative filed numerous motions and requests with respect to the investigation in
accordance with Article 5.25 of Annex 13. Specifically, the Polish side submitted 222 inquiries
for information to the Russian Federation. Only 34 inquiries were answered. The Russian
Federation ignored or refused to acknowledge 169 inquiries, and partially answered 19
inquires. As a result of this lack of cooperation from the Russian side, the Polish Accredited
Representative and his advisers were unable to fulfil their responsibilities under Annex 13.
Among the motions ignored or refused was a request for information regarding the assessment
of the minimum airdrome conditions at the Smolensk airport, a request for video recordings of
radar display readings by the Chief Air Traffic Controller on April 10, 2010 with respect to
landing approach of the following flights: Il-76, Yak-40, Tu-154M, a request for photographic
documentation from the crash scene, a request for data of the fly-around performed soon after
the crash, and requests for inspection of communication and navigation aids. The Polish side
did not receive any technical expertise of the wreckage debris or any data of two failed
attempts of Il-76 landings prior to the crash of PLF 101. A motion to authorize the Polish
Accredited Representative and two specialists to take part in the fly-around procedure was
denied. A protest against this refusal was ignored as well as the protest against the refusal of
the inspection of the RSP-6M2 radar system in Smolensk.
The Republic of Poland as the State having suffered fatalities of its President, First Lady, nine
generals and the top leadership, was denied access to the relevant factual information with
respect to rescue, first aid, survival data and autopsy examination in direct violation of Article
5.27 of Annex 13. As a result, the Polish side was unable to provide its response to vitally
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Smolensk Status Report November 2011
important parts of the IAC Final Report, including sections 1.13 Medical Tracing Examination,
1.14 Data on the Survival of Passengers, Crew Members and Others of the Aircraft Incident, and
3.1. Findings. In particular, the Russian side failed to provide to the Polish side the following
information:
1) documentation of forensic examination of the crew of the aircraft, together with the
results of toxicological and identification examination;
2) report of the inspection of the site; the Polish side has no knowledge as to where the
specific inspection areas were located and how they were marked. 5
The IAC Final Report provides no information about the rescue actions taken at the scene of the
accident. The Polish side has not received any transcripts of communication or situational plans,
reports of participants of the rescue and fire fighting teams, photographic documentation,
including film footage, which is essential for proper assessment of the security level of
Smolensk “Severny” airfield regarding fire fighting services, rescue operations and medical
security. The Polish side was not given access to the protocol of surveillance of the location of
the occurrence thus was not able to reply to Finding 3.1.67.
Similarly, the Polish side was not in the position to respond to Finding 3.1.68 of the IAC Final
Report that the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Forces General Andrzej Blasik was present
in the cockpit at the time of the impact with the ground. Furthermore, the Polish Side was not
in the position to respond to the statement that the coronary examination revealed 0.6‰ of
ethanol in the blood of the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Air Forces. Results of testing the
concentration of alcohol in the blood of the Polish Air Force Commander Blasik cannot be
independently verified because of the unavailability of the source documentation. No
authorized toxicological data and information as to when and how the material was secured for
analysis was provided to the Polish side. 6
All requests of the Polish side regarding the information with respect to smoke present in the
vicinity of the airport on the day of the crash were denied. Regular citations made by the
meteorologist from 4.00 a.m. UTC indicated the presence of smoke. The Polish inquiry as to the
source of fires and smoke in the area surrounding the airport at the time of the crash and its
adverse effect on atmospheric conditions was ignored as well. No information about the rescue
and extinguishing of fires was provided. No reports regarding testing for traces of explosive
materials were provided. Testing for non-conventional explosions were not made.
5 The Polish Response in English, p. 60.
6 The Polish Response in English, p. 143. In January 2011 IAC published on its website a document nr. 37
dated April 11, 2010 that purportedly represents testing of Gen. Błasik's blood. Medical experts point
out that a natural alcohol is produced in the body within 24 hours from death and can reach even 1
percent. Therefore other tests are required to verify such findings. However the Russian side did not
produce any other tests and did not present supporting documents. See also:
and
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Smolensk Status Report November 2011
Only 19 full post-mortem reports were provided; the remaining 77 are either grossly inaccurate
or not provided. Medical and pathological reports for some victims contain descriptions of
organs that had been surgically removed from the victims long before the crash. 7
The list of 169 Polish requests unanswered by the IAC as of December 19, 2010 remained
unchanged after the official presentation of the IAC Final Report on January 13, 2010. In August
2011, the Polish side officially confirmed that no additional information regarding the
outstanding 169 Polish inquires has been received from the Russian Federation. 8
IAC Final Report Does not Comply with Annex 13
The Polish Response to the IAC Final Report the Republic of Poland points out that the IAC Final
Report violates the standards of Annex and has been prepared in violation of the guidelines
contained in the ICAO Document Number 9756 entitled 'Manual of Aircraft Accident and
Incident Investigation,' (“ICAO Investigation Manual”). According to Annex 13, the first chapter
of the final report, entitled “Factual Information,” should contain only facts; while the analysis
should be included in the second chapter entitled “Analysis.” Thus, the Republic of Poland
objects to the inclusion of the so-called ‘psychological analysis’ as “Factual Information.” The
psychological analysis presented in this chapter is not based on facts and is not supported by
evidence. To the contrary, it is based on assumptions of highly speculative nature and stands in
contradiction to the Cockpit Voice Recorder (“CVR”) readings obtained by the Polish side. 9
Furthermore, contrary to ICAO Investigation Manual, the analysis presented in the second
chapter of the IAC Final Report is based on assumptions and hypotheses rather than facts and
relevant evidence presented under “Factual Information.” Hypotheses not supported by facts
should have been abandoned. Unfortunately, the hypotheses based on assumptions were not
abandoned, but instead were presented without conditional clauses as explained in the Polish
Response below:
The analysis should examine the evidence already presented in Chapter 1 . Factual
Information, and develop circumstances and situations that might occur. This should
lead to the formulation of possible hypotheses that should be discussed in the context of
the evidence gathered. Hypotheses unsupported by evidence should be rejected.
Hypotheses may not be treated as certainties , and their proof may not rely on
hypothetical evidence. The listed items are presented as statements in the form of
axioms; and conditional expressions, such as likely, possible, etc., were not used even
once. The analysis contains many repetitions as well as references to many facts that
were not included in the Factual Information . It does not focus on the description of
possible variants of the course of action and the assessment of the course of individual
7 See also:
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8 Official Statement of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs of August 2011.
9 See further discussion under 'Contradictions in the IAC Final Report.'
 

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