Von Schlieffen - Cannae.pdf

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BY
GeneralFieldmarshal Comr ALFREDVON E%XLIEFFEN
TEE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF SCHOOL@‘RESS
FORT LEAVBWWO~E, KANWS
1525-S-l-31--1M
I.931
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U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL
STAFF COLLEGE PRESS
In September 1991, the commandant of the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth authorized the establishment of the
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) Press. The
CGSC Press has the following missions:
0 To provide an outlet for the professional
publication of monographs and book-length works on all
subjects of interest to professional officers.
0 To aid in professional military education at all
levels of the U.S. Army and other military services,
foreign as well as domestic.
l To promote and support the advanced study of the
theory, history, and practice of the military art by
professional officers and other military experts.
0 To promote and support the professional
development of the CGSC faculty and faculties of other
institutions of higher military education in the United
States and abroad.
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PREFACE
In the early 198Os,the Combat Studies Institute received a
request for a study of all the cases in the past where armies
fought outnumbered and won. The point was to distill the
necessary ingredients that culminated in these armies’
victories. The flaw in this procedure, however, was that it
failed to consider the preponderant number of cases where
armies fought outnumbered and lost. A widened focus would
have eliminated a number of possible false conclusions.
A similar exercise was conducted eighty years earlier by
Count Alfred von Schlieffen, the revered chief of the German
General Staff. Convinced that Germany, surrounded by
powerful enemies, would have to fight outnumbered and win,
Schlieffen believed the key to victory could be discovered in an
account of the Battle of Cannae, written by the German
military historian Hans Delbrtick. Therefore, Schlieffen
ordered the historical section of the General Staff to produce a
set of “Cannae Studies” that would demonstrate that the
principle of double envelopment practiced by Hannibal at
Cannae was the master key to victory in battle.
During the interwar years, the Command and General
Staff School Press published two editions of a translation of
Schlieffen’s classic study. The current printing by the newly
formed Command and General Staff College Press is meant to
afford a new generation of army officers an experience of this
famous work of military theory. In so doing, it is probably not
remiss to caution readers that Hannibal’s victory at Cannae
still did not produce a strategic success, even though it was a
tactical masterpiece. Hannibal lost the war with Rome.
Likewise, Schlieffen’s operational concept collapsed in World
War I in the face of logistic and time-space realities he had
chosen to discount because he believed they were inconvenient
to his needs. The lesson to be learned from Schlieffen’s
experience is that history misapplied is worse than no history
at all.
kfiiLLJ@k
RICHARD M. SWAIN
Colonel, Field Artillery
Director, Combat Studies Institute
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword._.__...._____,
.___.___....__._............
____._____
_..___.I
____...._...._______.
___
_._____.__.
v
Introduction _____...___
________.___..__
_____._.._..
____.._._
_._____
___.._
____
..___.
____.__
__.__._._________
I_____._.
vii
List of Maps.__-....__.__.-.__.._..-..*....._-._..-......._....-...----...-..-.....-.-..--.
_._.._.........I_...
xi
CHAPTER I
THE BATTLE AT CANNAEL
__.____
..___._.____.____.__.-..--...“..
______
_.._
___._______
____.___...__-__._
I
CHAPTER II
FREDERICKTBE GREATANTJNAPOLEON.............................
_._..__.__.___
_..___-___
6
CHAPTER III
TEE CAMPAIGNOF 1866
The Prussian and Austrian Concentration ._..__.._..._
_....__.
_.._
I_.._...._......
_._._
_...__ 60
67
The Campaign in Bohemia of 1866 untii the evening of June 3&h.......... 85
KSniggratn. _._..___
__._...._......_....
_.._
._._
_
.._.__
_._____._..._...
____...__.___._.___..~.~....~~~...~
._......._
............_...__.
___...
__.._....._._.
.. ...131
CHAPTER IV
THE CAMPAIGNOF181Wil
From the concentration of the armies to the retreat of the French
acrossthe Moselle__.________.__
.._____.___._
_........_..__..
_._._
.__.
__..___
_....__
._..____
_____..
180
The advance of the Germans to and acrossthe Moselle. The Battles
of Colomky-Nouilly, and Mara la Tour.. _._._.__..
_I.._.___.__.__
......._
...._.__.
193
The Battle of Gravelotte-St. Privat __.___
_____.___.__._._.____
____.____
___
____.________._
____._
220
The Battles of Beaumont and Sedan.............______
__
___._.._
_
.______
__.~
__._.....__..___
_____
‘257
ii.3
______
_
~__._
__
The Campaign of 1866in Germany.........____
_._
____
_
____
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FOREWORD
This book was first brought to the attention of this
School in 1916 by a lecture delivered by Colonel Wilson B,
Burtt, Infantry, as to the observations of the United States
military mission headed by General Joseph E. Kuhn on its
visit to the German armies in 1915 and 1916. It was sub-
sequently translated at The Army War College and indi-
vidual officers in attendance there sought copies. At various
times efforts were made to have it published in English.
The stumbling block, both commercially and officially, was
the necessity for reproducing some one hundred maps or
sketches and without these t,he text would lose much of its
military value. Furthermore, it was necessary to obtain
the authority of the heirs of the author as well as that of
the publishers. Thanks to their courtesy this has been
satisfactorily arranged. This School has now undertaken
this task, without any expectation of profit, in order to
make available in English to the officers in attendance here
a truly great modern military book. It is great because of
the position and prestige of the writer and its influence
on the conduct of the World War. It is modern since no
one can attempt an understa,nding of many of the phases
of the last war without the background of the miIitary
theories herein presented. Furthermore, these theories
must be weighed, whether accepted or denied, in whole or
in part, in the major conceptions of a future war should,
unhappily, such occur. I have read and re-read my typed
copy from the War College days with a set of photostat
maps, certainly to my advantage because of the clear con-
cise statements of the military campaigns which serve as
the background and occasion for the presentation of the
author’s theories. Whether the theories are correct or not,
each one must judge for himself. In any case they should
be known and understood by offcers attending this School.
STUART KEINTZELMAN,
Briyadier Genera.E,U. S. Army,
Commandant.
0
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