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The Problems of Philosophy
The Problems of Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
The Problems of Philosophy
Table of Contents
The Problems of Philosophy ..............................................................................................................................1
Bertrand Russel. ......................................................................................................................................1
PREFACE. ...............................................................................................................................................1
CHAPTER I. APPEARANCE AND REALITY . ...................................................................................1
CHAPTER II. THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER. ..................................................................................5
CHAPTER III. THE NATURE OF MATTER. ......................................................................................8
CHAPTER IV. IDEALISM . .................................................................................................................12
DESCRIPTION ...................................................................................................................................15
CHAPTER VI. ON INDUCTION . .......................................................................................................20
CHAPTER VII. ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES. .........................................23
CHAPTER VIII. HOW A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE . ...................................................27
CHAPTER IX. THE WORLD OF UNIVERSALS. .............................................................................30
CHAPTER X. ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS. ............................................................34
CHAPTER XI. ON INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE. ...............................................................................37
CHAPTER XII. TRUTH AND FALSEHOOD . ...................................................................................40
CHAPTER XIII. KNOWLEDGE, ERROR, AND PROBABLE OPINION.. ......................................44
CHAPTER XIV. THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE . ..........................................47
CHAPTER XV. THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY . ............................................................................51
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE. ..............................................................................................................54
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The Problems of Philosophy
Bertrand Russell
This page copyright © 2001 Blackmask Online.
http://www.blackmask.com
·
PREFACE
IN the following pages I have confined myself in the main to those problems of philosophy in regard to
which I thought it possible to say something positive and constructive, since merely negative criticism
seemed out of place. For this reason, theory of knowledge occupies a larger space than metaphysics in the
present volume, and some topics much discussed by philosophers are treated very briefly, if at all.
I have derived valuable assistance from unpublished writings of G. E. Moore and J. M. Keynes: from the
former, as regards the relations of sense−data to physical objects, and from the latter as regards probability
and induction. I have also profited greatly by the criticisms and suggestions of Professor Gilbert Murray.
1912
NOTE TO SEVENTEENTH IMPRESSION
WITH reference to certain statements on pages 44, 75, 131, and 132, it should be remarked that this book was
written in the early part of 1912 when China was still an Empire, and the name of the then late Prime
Minister did begin with the letter B. 1943
CHAPTER I. APPEARANCE AND REALITY
IS there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it? This question,
which at first sight might not seem difficult, is really one of the most difficult that can be asked. When we
have realized the obstacles in the way of a straightforward and confident answer, we shall be well launched
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The Problems of Philosophy
on the study of philosophy −− for philosophy is merely the attempt to answer such ultimate questions, not
carelessly and dogmatically, as we do in ordinary life and even in the sciences, but critically after exploring
all that makes such questions puzzling, and after realizing all the vagueness and confusion that underlie our
ordinary ideas.
In daily life, we assume as certain many things which, on a closer scrutiny, are found to be so full of apparent
contradictions that only a great amount of thought enables us to know what it is that we really may believe. In
the search for certainty, it is natural to begin with our present experiences, and in some sense, no doubt,
knowledge is to be derived from them. But any statement as to what it is that our immediate experiences
make us know is very likely to be wrong. It seems to me that I am now sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain
shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. By turning my head I see out of the window
buildings and clouds and the sun. I believe that the sun is about ninety−three million miles from the earth;
that it is a hot globe many times bigger than the earth; that, owing to the earth's rotation, it rises every
morning, and will continue to do so for an indefinite time in the future. I believe that, if any other normal
person comes into my room, he will see the same chairs and tables and books and papers as I see, and that the
table which I see is the same as the table which I feel pressing against my arm. All this seems to be so evident
as to be hardly worth stating, except in answer to a man who doubts whether I know anything. Yet all this
may be reasonably doubted, and all of it requires much careful discussion before we can be sure that we have
stated it in a form that is wholly true.
To make our difficulties plain, let us concentrate attention on the table. To the eye it is oblong, brown and
shiny, to the touch it is smooth and cool and hard; when I tap it, it gives out a wooden sound. Any one else
who sees and feels and hears the table will agree with this description, so that it might seem as if no difficulty
would arise; but as soon as we try to be more precise our troubles begin. Although I believe that the table is
'really' of the same colour all over, the parts that reflect the light look much brighter than the other parts, and
some parts look white because of reflected light. I know that, if I move, the parts that reflect the light will be
different, so that the apparent distribution of colours on the table will change. It follows that if several people
are looking at the table at the same moment, no two of them will see exactly the same distribution of colours,
because no two can see it from exactly the same point of view, and any change in the point of view makes
some change in the way the light is reflected.
For most practical purposes these differences are unimportant, but to the painter they are all−important: the
painter has to unlearn the habit of thinking that things seem to have the colour which common sense says
they 'really' have, and to learn the habit of seeing things as they appear. Here we have already the beginning
of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy −− the distinction between 'appearance' and
'reality', between what things seem to be and what they are. The painter wants to know what things seem to
be, the practical man and the philosopher want to know what they are; but the philosopher's wish to know this
is stronger than the practical man's, and is more troubled by knowledge as to the difficulties of answering the
question.
To return to the table. It is evident from what we have found, that there is no colour which preeminently
appears to be the colour of the table, or even of any one particular part of the table −− it appears to be of
different colours from different points of view, and there is no reason for regarding some of these as more
really its colour than others. And we know that even from a given point of view the colour will seem different
by artificial light, or to a colour−blind man, or to a man wearing blue spectacles, while in the dark there will
be no colour at all, though to touch and hearing the table will be unchanged. This colour is not something
which is inherent in the table, but something depending upon the table and the spectator and the way the light
falls on the table. When, in ordinary life, we speak of the colour of the table, we only mean the sort of colour
which it will seem to have to a normal spectator from an ordinary point of view under usual conditions of
light. But the other colours which appear under other conditions have just as good a right to be considered
real; and therefore, to avoid favouritism, we are compelled to deny that, in itself, the table has any one
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The Problems of Philosophy
particular colour.
The same thing applies to the texture. With the naked eye one can see the gram, but otherwise the table looks
smooth and even. If we looked at it through a microscope, we should see roughnesses and hills and valleys,
and all sorts of differences that are imperceptible to the naked eye. Which of these is the 'real' table? We are
naturally tempted to say that what we see through the microscope is more real, but that in turn would be
changed by a still more powerful microscope. If, then, we cannot trust what we see with the naked eye, why
should we trust what we see through a microscope? Thus, again, the confidence in our senses with which we
began deserts us.
The shape of the table is no better. We are all in the habit of judging as to the 'real' shapes of things, and we
do this so unreflectingly that we come to think we actually see the real shapes. But, in fact, as we all have to
learn if we try to draw, a given thing looks different in shape from every different point of view. If our table
is 'really' rectangular, it will look, from almost all points of view, as if it had two acute angles and two obtuse
angles. If opposite sides are parallel, they will look as if they converged to a point away from the spectator; if
they are of equal length, they will look as if the nearer side were longer. All these things are not commonly
noticed in looking at a table, because experience has taught us to construct the 'real' shape from the apparent
shape, and the 'real' shape is what interests us as practical men. But the 'real' shape is not what we see; it is
something inferred from what we see. And what we see is constantly changing in shape as we, move about
the room; so that here again the senses seem not to give us the truth about the table itself, but only about the
appearance of the table.
Similar difficulties arise when we consider the sense of touch. It is true that the table always gives us a
sensation of hardness, and we feel that it resists pressure. But the sensation we obtain depends upon how hard
we press the table and also upon what part of the body we press with; thus the various sensations due to
various pressures or various parts of the body cannot be supposed to reveal directly any definite property of
the table, but at most to be signs of some property which perhaps causes all the sensations, but is not actually
apparent in any of them. And the same applies still more obviously to the sounds which can be elicited by
rapping the table.
Thus it becomes evident that the real table, if there is one, is not the same as what we immediately experience
by sight or touch or hearing. The real table, if there is one, is not immediately known to us at all, but must be
an inference from what is immediately known. Hence, two very difficult questions at once arise; namely, (1)
Is there a real table at all? (2) If so, what sort of object can it be?
It will help us in considering these questions to have a few simple terms of which the meaning is definite and
clear. Let us give the name of 'sense−data' to the things that are immediately known in sensation: such things
as colours, sounds, smells, hardnesses, roughnesses, and so on. We shall give the name 'sensation' to the
experience of being immediately aware of these things. Thus, whenever we see a colour, we have a sensation
of the colour, but the colour itself is a sense−datum, not a sensation. The colour is that of which we are
immediately aware, and the awareness itself is the sensation. It is plain that if we are to know anything about
the table, it must be by means of the sense−data −− brown colour, oblong shape, smoothness, etc. −− which
we associate with the table; but, for the reasons which have been given, we cannot say that the table is the
sense−data, or even that the sense−data are directly properties of the table. Thus a problem arises as to the
relation of the sense−data to the real table, supposing there is such a thing.
The real table, if it exists, we will call a 'physical object'. Thus we have to consider the relation of sense−data
to physical objects. The collection of all physical objects is called 'matter'. Thus our two questions may be
re−stated as follows: (1) Is there any such thing as matter? (2) If so, what is its nature?
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