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Evolutionary Dynamics
and Extensive Form Games
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Economic Learning and Social Evolution
General Editor
Ken Binmore, Director of the Economic Learning and Social
Evolution Centre, University College London.
1. Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, Larry Samuelson,
1997
2. The Theory of Learning in Games, Drew Fudenberg and David
K. Levine, 1998
3. Game Theory and the Social Contract, Volume 2: Just Playing, Ken
Binmore, 1998
4. Social Dynamics, Steven N. Durlauf and H. Peyton Young,
editors, 2001
5. Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games, Ross
Cressman, 2003
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Evolutionary Dynamics
and Extensive Form Games
Ross Cressman
The MIT Press
Cambridge, Massachusetts
London, England
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c
2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic
or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and
retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher.
This book was set in Palatino by Interactive Composition Corporation (in L A T E X ) and was
printed and bound in the United States of America.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Cressman, Ross.
Evolutionary dynamics and extensive form games / Ross Cressman.
p. cm. — (Economic learning and social evolution ; 5)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-262-03305-4 (hc. : alk. paper)
1. Game theory. 2. Evolution—Mathematical models. I. Title. II. MIT Press
series on economic learning and social evolution ; 5.
QA269 .C69 2003
519.3—dc21
2002038682
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