Affective-consciousness-Core-emotional-feelings-in-animals-and-humans_2005_Consciousness-and-Cognition.pdf

Consciousness

and

Cognition

Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 30–80

www.elsevier.com/locate/concog

Aﬀective consciousness: Core emotional feelings

in animals and humans

Jaak Panksepp

Department of Psychology, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403, USA

Falk Center for Molecular Therapeutics, Department of Biomedical Engineering,

McCormick School of Engineerings, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA

Received 7 February 2004

Available online 16 December 2004

Abstract

The position advanced in this paper is that the bedrock of emotional feelings is contained within the

evolved emotional action apparatus of mammalian brains. This dual-aspect monism approach to brain–

mind functions, which asserts that emotional feelings may reﬂect the neurodynamics of brain systems that

generate instinctual emotional behaviors, saves us from various conceptual conundrums. In coarse form,

primary process aﬀective consciousness seems to be fundamentally an unconditional ‘‘gift of nature’’ rather

than an acquired skill, even though those systems facilitate skill acquisition via various felt reinforcements.

Aﬀective consciousness, being a comparatively intrinsic function of the brain, shared homologously by all

mammalian species, should be the easiest variant of consciousness to study in animals. This is not to deny

that some secondary processes (e.g., awareness of feelings in the generation of behavioral choices) cannot

be evaluated in animals with suciently clever behavioral learning procedures, as with place-preference

procedures and the analysis of changes in learned behaviors after one has induced re-valuation of incen-

tives. Rather, the claim is that a direct neuroscientiﬁc study of primary process emotional/aﬀective states

is best achieved through the study of the intrinsic (‘‘instinctual’’), albeit experientially reﬁned, emotional

action tendencies of other animals. In this view, core emotional feelings may reﬂect the neurodynamic

attractor landscapes of a variety of extended trans-diencephalic, limbic emotional action systems—includ-

ing SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST, CARE, PANIC, and PLAY. Through a study of these brain sys-

tems, the neural infrastructure of human and animal aﬀective consciousness may be revealed. Emotional

E-mail address: jpankse@bgnet.bgsu.ed.

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2004.10.004

J. Panksepp / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 30–80

feelings are instantiated in large-scale neurodynamics that can be most eﬀectively monitored via the etho-

logical analysis of emotional action tendencies and the accompanying brain neurochemical/electrical

changes. The intrinsic coherence of such emotional responses is demonstrated by the fact that they can

be provoked by electrical and chemical stimulation of speciﬁc brain zones—eﬀects that are aﬀectively laden.

For substantive progress in this emerging research arena, animal brain researchers need to discuss aﬀective

brain functions more openly. Secondary awareness processes, because of their more conditional, contextu-

ally situated nature, are more dicult to understand in any neuroscientiﬁc detail. In other words, the infor-

mation-processing brain functions, critical for cognitive consciousness, are harder to study in other animals

than the more homologous emotional/motivational aﬀective state functions of the brain.

Keywords: Emotions; Aﬀect; Consciousness; Animals; Brain; Seeking; Fear; Anger; Panic; Sadness; Play; Care

1. Toward a science of animal consciousness

Do other animals have internal experiences? Probably, but there are no mindscopes to evaluate

the existence of consciousness in either animals or humans. If we are going to entertain the exis-

tence of experiential states (i.e., consciousness) in other animals, we must be willing to work at a

theoretical level where arguments are adjudicated by the weight of evidence rather than deﬁnitive

proof. Such approaches are easier to apply for certain aspects of animal consciousness than for

others. My focus here will be on primary-process aﬀective consciousness, many aspects of which

may be homologous in humans and other animals. I will proceed from the premise that progress

in achieving a deeply scientiﬁc human psychology lies in our ability to specify which neuropsycho-

logical tendencies evolution constructed within the genetically dictated brain organization and

psychobehavioral potentials of the intrinsic neurodynamics of ancestral species ( Panksepp &

Panksepp, 2000 ). A detailed neuroscientiﬁc understanding of basic human emotions may depend

critically on understanding comparable animal emotions. 1 As I have noted many times ‘‘As long

as psychology and neuroscience remain more preoccupied with the human brains impressive cor-

tico-cognitive systems than subcortical aﬀective ones, our understanding of the sources of human

consciousness will remain woefully incomplete’’ ( Panksepp, 2004a, p. 58 ).

I will advance the case that one widely neglected form of animal/human consciousness—one

that creates internally experienced emotional feeling states—is now suciently well understood

to permit an armative answer to my opening question. Other mammals do have aﬀective

experiences. Such states may be a common denominator for a detailed cross-species analysis

of relevant brain functions because scientiﬁc variants of anthropomorphism can guide the study

of integrative mind–brain functions in other animals. I will explore the possibility that basic

emotional feelings—a primary process type of phenomenology—may be grounded on instinc-

tual action systems that promote unconditional emotional behaviors. Although such ‘‘ancestral

voices of the genes’’ ( Buck, 1999, p. 324 ) undergo a great deal of elaboration epigenetically, the

1 Humans are animals, but it is tedious to continually use the qualiﬁer ‘‘other animals’’ when making contrasts to

non-human animals. Whenever ‘‘animal’’ is used without the qualiﬁer, it is simply for stylistic grace. At times the term

‘‘animalian’’ is also used when referring to human brain functions, and this is intended to mean the kinds of brain

systems that are strikingly homologous in all mammals that have been studied.

J. Panksepp / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 30–80

fundamental similarity of core aﬀective processes across mammalian species may permit neuro-

ethological work on animal-models to reveal the bedrock of human consciousness. My own

work proceeds from a Spinozan-type dual-aspect monism premise—namely that primary-process

aﬀective consciousness emerges from large-scale neurodynamics of a variety of emotional sys-

tems that coordinate instinctual emotional actions ( Panksepp, 2001a, 2001b, 2004b ).

Before proceeding, let me provide a few terminological clariﬁcations. I use the term emotion as

the ‘‘umbrella’’ concept that includes aﬀective, cognitive, behavioral, expressive, and a host of

physiological changes. Aﬀect is the subjective experiential-feeling component that is very hard

to describe verbally, but there are a variety of distinct aﬀects, some linked more critically to bod-

ily events (homeostatic drives like hunger and thirst), others to external stimuli (taste, touch,

etc). Emotional aﬀects are closely linked to internal brain action states, triggered typically by

environmental events. All are complex intrinsic functions of the brain, which are triggered by

perceptions and become experientially reﬁned. Psychologists have traditionally conceptualized

such ‘‘spooky’’ mental issues in terms of valence (various feelings of goodness and badness—po-

sitive and negative aﬀects), arousal (how intense are the feelings), and surgency or power (how

much does a certain feeling ﬁll ones mental life). There are a large number of such aﬀective

states of consciousness, presumably reﬂecting diﬀerent types of global neurodynamics within

the brain and body. Even though there is currently no agreed upon taxonomy of aﬀective states

( Ostow, 2004; Panksepp & Pincus, 2004 ), in this essay I will largely focus on the emotional, ac-

tion-oriented aﬀects, as opposed to sensory pleasures and displeasures, and the various back-

ground bodily feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction. I will continue to advance the view

that speciﬁc emotional aﬀects largely reﬂect the operations of distinct emotional operating sys-

tems that are concentrated in sub-neocortical, limbic regions of the brain ( MacLean, 1990; Pank-

sepp, 1998a ).

For present purposes, the term consciousness refers to brain states that have an experiential

feel to them, and it is envisioned as a multi-tiered process that needs to be viewed in evolu-

tionary terms, with multiple layers of emergence. Primary-process consciousness may reﬂect

raw sensory/perceptual feelings and the types of internal emotional/motivational experiences

just discussed. Secondary-consciousness may reﬂect the capacity to have thoughts about expe-

riences, especially about how external events relate to internal events. Although animals surely

do not think about their lives linguistically, they may think in terms of perceptual images.

Finally, there are tertiary forms of consciousness—thoughts about thoughts, awareness of

awareness—much of which is unique to humans and requires expansive neocortical tissues

that permit linguistic–symbolic transformation of simple thoughts and remembered

experiences.

Those who are not willing to give animals any consciousness are probably thinking about the

tertiary human-typical linguistic variants. They may also be generalizing too readily from human

perceptual consciousness, which is clearly dependent on neocortical functions, to an aﬀective con-

sciousness whose locus of control is largely sub-neocortical ( Liotti & Panksepp, 2004 ). There are

reasons to believe that aﬀective experience may reﬂect a most primitive form of consciousness

( Panksepp, 2000b, 2004b ), which may have provided an evolutionary platform for the emergence

of more complex layers of consciousness.

Core emotional aﬀects may reﬂect the neurodynamic attractor landscapes of a variety of ex-

tended trans-diencephalic ‘‘energetic’’ action systems—e.g., SEEKING, FEAR, RAGE, LUST,

J. Panksepp / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 30–80

Fig. 1. A cartoon depiction of the various neural interactions that are deﬁning characteristics of all major emotional

systems of the brain: (1) various sensory stimuli can unconditionally access emotional systems; (2) emotional systems

can generate instinctual motor outputs, as well as (3) modulate sensory inputs, promoting incentive salience. (4)

Emotional systems have positive feedback components which can sustain emotional arousal after precipitating events

have passed, and (5) these systems can be modulated by cognitive inputs, and (6) these systems can modify and channel

cognitive activities, again modulating incentive salience. Also, the important criterion that emotional systems create

aﬀective states is not included, but it is assumed that arousal of the whole executive circuit for each emotion is essential

for getting feelings going within the brain, perhaps by interacting with other brain circuits for self-representation that

may arise from midbrain systems such as the PAG ( Panksepp, 1998b ). Reprinted from Fig. 3.3 of Aﬀective Neuroscience

( Panksepp, 1998a ) with permission of Oxford University Press.

CARE, PANIC, and PLAY—which need to be deﬁned in neural terms ( Fig. 1 ). 2 These highly

overlapping state functions share many neuropsychological components (e.g., biogenic amines),

and they energize and are reciprocally regulated by cortico-cognitive activities (information-pro-

cessing systems that perceive and discriminate environmental events). Through such reciprocal

interactions and embeddings, secondary and tertiary forms of extended consciousness emerge.

However, attempts to utilize work on animal aﬀective states to understand the corresponding hu-

man feelings remain a revolutionary activity in consciousness studies. This is because aﬀects can-

not be unambiguously visualized or well operationalized, unless one is willing to take the

emotional actions of other organisms as the necessary starting points of empirical inquiries ( Pank-

sepp, 1998a ).

Many human investigators believe that human consciousness, aﬀective and otherwise, emerges

from higher brain functions that most other mammals do not have, and that all we can really

study in animals are emotional behaviors ( Craig, 2003a, 2003b ; Damasio, 2003a, 2003b ; Dolan,

2002 ), with no possible further inferences about mind-dynamics. Many behavioral neuroscientists

(e.g., LeDoux, 1996; Rolls, 1999 ) are not yet ready to conceptualize the neuro-mental lives of ani-

mals in psychological terms. This is because for a whole century we have not had the disciplinary

will to move beyond the safe harbor of logical positivism in animal brain research, to seek those

broader organizational principles that may grant other animals psychological capacities which, in

2 Capitalizations are used for designating emotional systems, as in Panksepp (1998a) . This convention serves two

purposes: (1) it highlights that the referents are speciﬁc neural systems of the brain, all of which are only partly

understood, (2) it hopefully minimizes the likelihood that by using the vernacular, we will be accused of promoting

part–whole confusions (i.e., a slice does not the whole pie make)—see Bennett and Hacker (2003) for a full analysis of

such endemic problems in functional neuroscience. Our research aim is to identify the necessary neural components of

basic emotions, without suggesting that this provides a sucient explanation for all of the attributes that such emotions

connote in the human mind.

J. Panksepp / Consciousness and Cognition 14 (2005) 30–80

the tradition of dualism, have been at times reserved, arbitrarily, for humans. Such views often

ignore the substantial databases, sampled herein, that suggest how raw aﬀective experiences

may reﬂect an ancient form of consciousness, with a sub-neocortical locus of control, where rel-

evant animal–human homologies abound. 1 Accordingly, a brief historical perspective is also

shared on why straightforward cross-species monistic strategies have not been energetically imple-

mented in Anglo-American behavioral neuroscience.

Although no argument in this area can be deﬁnitive, I will seek to coax some skeptics to be a bit

more open-minded, which is most dicult once ontological biases have taken root. Indeed, I

asked a friend who is a rigorous neuro-behaviorist, to read a draft of this paper, but the response

was: ‘‘Thanks for the invitation to comment... however, I have sworn oﬀ any eﬀort to discuss

consciousness with any neuroscientists—it is a bad habit of mine, and Im convinced it comes

to no good.’’ I responded shortly with my own synopsis of what needs to be done: ‘‘Tis under-

standable, especially if one believes such issues cant be addressed empirically. I suspect that on

the cognitive-learning side that is most dicult (even though at least one solid behaviorist, Tony

Dickinson at Cambridge, thinks they now have compelling data). My own take is that neurosci-

ence advances make it an especially workable topic on the aﬀective-emotional side, but only if one

is willing to subscribe to radically monistic ideas, such as my preferred dual-aspect monism, with

the coup de grace being predictions at the human level that can be falsiﬁed. But if one still sub-

scribes to any variant of dualism, including the neuro or speciest varieties, then it is quite impos-

sible. But even in the best of circumstances it is a dicult task, fraught with conceptual and

empirical problems, and ultimately based on theoretical inference and the weight of evidence.

Why bother? Because if that is a true aspect of mammalian brain functions, as I suspect it is,

who better to deal with it than us neuroscientists?’’ The area needs critical dialog. Otherwise, it

will remain a topic that is suitable only for tavern-talk.

It is perhaps regrettable that the emerging community of scholars who do favor the acceptance

of consciousness in animals still relies so heavily on anecdotal evidence that generates no new pre-

dictions concerning the underlying neuro-causal processes. Comparative neuro-psycho-behavioral

analyses oﬀer the needed bridging strategies. The anecdotal approach, taken alone, allows critics

to remain reﬂexively dismissive about the critical importance of consciousness studies in other ani-

mals. The present essay constitutes an elaboration of previous eﬀorts to redress the intellectual

imbalance that has emerged in behavioral neuroscience ( Panksepp, 1982, 1998a, 2004a, 2004b ),

which is reﬂected all too commonly with a failure to engage with the topic.

2. Anecdotal approaches to animal emotions

At present, as was popular during earlier eras (e.g., Lindsay, 1879 ; Romanes, 1897 ), there is a

growing animal behavior literature that vigorously seeks to arm that other animals do have

emotional lives. Naturalistic observations oﬀer an invaluable perspective on what animals can

do when they are reared in the real world as opposed to artiﬁcial laboratories where they often

become psychologically constricted (e.g., ‘‘kennelized’’—see Panksepp, Conner, Forster, Bishop,

& Scott (1983) ). A recent collection of anecdotes, many from scientists, makes a compelling mod-

ern case for considering animal feelings openly once more (Smile of a Dolphin, edited by Bekoﬀ,

2000 ; to which I was pleased to contribute). Another recent ‘‘popular’’ oﬀering is Jeﬀrey Massons

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